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ABSTRACT
Attack graphs used in network security analysis are analyzed to determine
sequences of exploits that lead to successful acquisition of privileges or data
at critical assets. An attack graph edge corresponds to a vulnerability, tac-
itly assuming a connection exists and tacitly assuming the vulnerability is
known to exist. In this thesis, we explore use of uncertain graphs to extend
the paradigm to include lack of certainty in connection and/or existence of a
vulnerability. We extend the standard notion of uncertain graph (where the
existence of each edge is probabilistically independent) however, as signifi-
cant correlations on edge existence probabilities exist in practice, owing to
common underlying causes for disconnectivity and/or presence of vulnerabil-
ities. Our extension describes each edge probability as a Boolean expression
of independent indicator random variables. This thesis (i) shows that this
formalism is maximally descriptive in the sense that it can describe any joint
probability distribution function of edge existence, (ii) shows that when these
Boolean expressions are monotone then we can easily perform uncertainty
analysis of edge probabilities, and (iii) uses these results to model a partial
attack graph of the Stuxnet worm and a small enterprise network and to
answer important security-related questions in a probabilistic manner.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
As computers become more ubiquitous in critical infrastructures, evaluating
the effect of vulnerabilities becomes increasingly important. In order to make
decisions about defense measures, it is vital to study the paths that an at-
tacker might take to intrude into a target network and disrupt services. The
attack graph formalism [1] is a representation of the possible ways in which
an attacker can get to the desired target host by exploiting vulnerabilities on
network hosts while gaining the required privileges at each step. The first
step in attack graph generation is analyzing the connectivity of the network
components and is termed reachability analysis [2]. This information is used
to determine if a target host is reachable by an attacker from his current
host. Ideally, information about the network topology of the target network,
applications running on network hosts, access control rules for the network,
and the trust relationships between hosts is known to the modeler. Accu-
racy and exhaustiveness of network configuration information directly affects
accuracy of the generated attack graph [3].
Despite being a useful and well-developed tool, attack graphs have de-
terministic semantics and hence are not capable of expressing uncertainty
[4], which is inherent to any model. For our interests, uncertainty arises
mainly from three sources: there is the uncertainty about (i) the attacker
(e.g. his skill set, goal, and knowledge), (ii) the system being modeled (e.g.
the versions and configuration details of network services and their associated
vulnerabilities), and (iii) the environment in which the system is operated
(including the legitimate users and administrators). In each category, uncer-
tainty may also come in different shapes, due to either the lack, inadequacy,
inaccuracy, or sometimes inconsistency of information. Ideally we should be
able to use an attack graph not only to identify possible pathways of attack
but also to quantify uncertainty about those pathways.
This thesis aims to integrate uncertainty into security modeling and analy-
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sis of computer systems. As a first step, we choose to focus only on studying
uncertainty about the system. Hence, uncertainties about the attacker and
the environment (and their implications) will not be considered. Under this
setup, we propose to use uncertain graphs – graphs where potential edges are
labeled with an existence probability. Uncertain graphs have been success-
fully applied to various problems in different domains [5], [6], [7], [8] while
being deeply rooted in network reliability [9]. We use them to analyze uncer-
tainty of the existence of stepping stone attacks encoded in data structures
like attack graphs. However, the usual definition of uncertain graph assumes
edges exist independently of each other [10], [11], [12], a major issue when
applied to security modeling, e.g., as one vulnerability may simultaneously
enable attacks from and/or to multiple hosts. Furthermore, existing uncer-
tain graph research does not consider the precision of connectivity subjected
to change or to uncertainty in edge existences; in other contexts, uncertainty
analysis tells us in what cases a robust conclusion can be made in the face
of model input uncertainty.
A major portion of this work aims to address these two issues. For the first
issue, we extend the uncertain graph formalism and model the correlation
between edge existence due to common underlying causes. We describe com-
mon causes using independent Bernoulli random variables and use Boolean
expressions of the random variables to express the edge existence probabil-
ities. For the second issue, we show how uncertainty analysis of uncertain
graphs can be easily done when the Boolean expressions are monotone [13],
i.e. they do not use negation of random variables. In summary, our contri-
butions are fourfold:
1. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to propose uncertain
graphs for security modeling and analysis of systems with uncertainty.
2. We extend the traditional uncertain graph formalism to model the cor-
relation between edge existence and prove theoretical results about the
expressiveness of uncertain graphs.
3. We perform uncertainty analysis of uncertain graphs by leveraging the
monotonicity of reachability.
4. We show how to use uncertain graphs to model systems with uncer-
tainty and how the graphs help answer different security-related ques-
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tions about the modeled systems in a probabilistic manner.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the
related work, Chapter 3 discusses background on uncertain graphs, Chapter
4 extends the uncertain graph formalism and proves some theoretical results,
Chapter 5 describes uncertainty analysis of uncertain graphs, Chapters 6 and
7 show two case studies with numerical results, and Chapter 8 concludes the
thesis.
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CHAPTER 2
RELATED WORK
2.1 Uncertain graphs
Uncertain graphs, also known as probabilistic graphs, have been applied to
modeling of problems from various domains like interaction between pro-
teins using noisy and error-prone experimental data [5], entity resolution for
inexact machine learned models [6], optimal reachability in intermittently
connected networks with known routing algorithms [7], path queries on road
networks with unexpected traffic jams [8], and many others. The power of
uncertain graphs comes from their capability of modeling systems with uncer-
tainty, whether due to lack of knowledge about certain parts of the systems
[7], [8] or to noisy model data [5], [6]. Uncertain graphs are deeply rooted in
classical network reliability [9], [14], [15].
Reasoning with uncertain graphs is challenging since most problems in un-
certain graphs are computationally hard. For example, counting the number
of possible worlds of an uncertain graph in which vertex s reaches vertex t
is #P-complete (ST-CONNECTEDNESS [15]). Potamias et al. [16] derived
sampling-based approximation algorithms for the k-nearest neighbor problem
of uncertain graphs. Jin et al. [10] formulated the distance-constraint reach-
ability (DCR) problem and introduced efficient recursive sampling schemes
to estimate DCR of large uncertain graphs. Khan et al. [11] studied relia-
bility search problems of uncertain graphs, i.e. finding all vertices reachable
from some query vertices with probability no less than a given threshold,
using RQ-tree. Recently, [12] proposed recursive stratified sampling-based
estimators to reduce the variance of the standard Monte Carlo approach in
estimating uncertain graph properties.
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2.2 Scenario graphs
The operation of systems can be modeled to be in different states at different
instants of time. While most states might be benign, there exist critical
states that can lead the system to failure. A failure scenario is described
as a sequence of events that violate a correctness property defined for the
system. A scenario graph [17] is an exhaustive and succinct representation of
all failure scenarios. A special case of the scenario graph is an attack graph.
2.3 Attack graphs
An attack graph models the possible ways an attacker might get access to a
critical asset by exploiting a set of vulnerabilities on the services running on
the hosts. The vertices of the graph represent the privilege levels of the at-
tacker on the network hosts, and the edges represent the vulnerabilities that
the attacker could exploit [18]. Traditionally, teams of experts have looked
at the services running on hosts to determine vulnerability information and
have coupled this with network information, such as the connectivity of hosts,
to build out these attack graphs. Due to the manual nature of the construc-
tion of such attack graphs, they are prone to error and often not exhaustive.
Automated attack graph generation using model checking was introduced by
Ritchey and Ammann [19]. The model check, however, provided just a sin-
gle attack scenario. Sheyner et al. [20] use model checking on heterogeneous
networks to provide an exhaustive list of attack scenarios. A more scalable
solution for larger networks has been proposed in [21]. Another optimiza-
tion using the monotonicity property has been proposed by Ammann et al.
[22]. Work in [23] and [24] uses Bayesian networks to capture the uncer-
tainty of information in attack graphs. However, we believe that the acyclic
nature of Bayesian networks limits their ability to model the possible cyclic
relationships that arise in many practical situations.
Another related aspect is the process of reachablity analysis. Reachability
analysis of a network investigates the conditions under which a target host
can be reached by an attacking host. Network scanners [25] and vulnerability
discovery tools [26] can be leveraged to derive the configuration of the target
network.
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CHAPTER 3
UNCERTAIN GRAPHS
3.1 Overview of uncertain graphs
Uncertain graphs extend the definition of a deterministic graph by ascrib-
ing to each of a deterministic graph’s edges an existence probability [10],
[12], [16]. Formally, let G = (V,E) denote a deterministic graph1 where
V = {V1, . . . , Vn} and E = {E1, . . . , Em} are the set of vertices and edges.
The uncertain graph G = (V,E, p), where p = (p1, . . . , pm) ∈ [0, 1]m, allows
each edge Ei ∈ E to exist independently of the others and with probability
pi for i = 1, . . . ,m. We call p the probability assignment vector of E. An
uncertain graph may contain both certain edges – edges that exist with prob-
ability zero or one – and uncertain edges – edges that exist with probability
strictly greater than 0 and less than 1. When all edges are certain edges,
the uncertain graph degenerates to a deterministic graph. In the literature,
uncertain graphs are sometimes treated as generative models of determin-
istic graphs [10], [16]. In this view, every deterministic graph G = (V,E ′)
where E ′ ⊆ E is called a possible world (or possible outcome) of G. Slightly
abusing the notation, we denote this as G ∈ G. Similar to saying a fair coin
generates the head outcome with probability 0.5, we say the G generates G
with probability:
wG,G =
∏
Ei∈E′
pi
∏
Ei∈E\E′
(1− pi) (3.1)
The uncertain graph G generates an exponential number of 2m possible
worlds, out of which only 2m
′
exist with nonzero probabilities, where m′ ≤ m
is the number of uncertain edges in G. For example, the probability of Gi in
Figure 3.1 is wGi,G = p1p2(1 − p3)(1 − p4)p5. Obviously wG,G ∈ [0, 1] for all
1We only consider simple directed graphs.
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Figure 3.1: A 4-vertex, 5-edge uncertain graph and three of its 32 possible
worlds. In security modeling, s denotes the starting point (e.g. a
compromised computer in the network) and t the ending point of the attack
(e.g. a critical computer that the attacker wants to gain access to).
G ∈ G and the law of total probability dictates that ∑G∈G wG,G = 1.
An uncertain graph is distinguished from a Bayesian network [23], [24],
which was originally designed to summarize joint probability distributions.
While Bayesian networks are acyclic, cyclic relationships arise from many
practical situations and are allowed in uncertain graphs. Wang et al. [23]
circumvented the problem with cycles, but the technique relies on metric-
dependent properties. Uncertain graphs also do not assume the state tran-
sition modeled in transition systems [27] (e.g. Markov decision processes,
probabilistic automata.) Such transitions have a subtle drawback in security
modeling of computer networks since an attacker does not “jump” from one
place to the other. Instead, he gains access to more and more places as the
attack progresses and is capable of showing up at multiple places at the same
time.
3.2 Reachability of uncertain graphs
For any given graph property, a deterministic graph either has the property
or does not have it. Since edges in uncertain graphs are random, we will
speak of the probability that an uncertain graph has a given property, as the
sum of the probabilities of its possible worlds that possess that property. We
are particularly interested in reachability.
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Using mathematical symbols, given a deterministic graph G and two ver-
tices s and t, let function Rs,t(G) denote the s, t-reachability of G, formally:
Rs,t(G) =
1, if there is a path from s to t in G0, otherwise
For example, in Figure 3.1, Rs,t(Gi) = Rs,t(G32) = 1 and Rs,t(G1) = 0. The
two vertices s and t remain mostly unchanged throughout the paper. When
the context is clear, we will refer to s, t-reachability simply as reachability.
Let G = (V,E, p) be an uncertain graph, the reachability of G is defined as the
reachability of an average possible world G in G weighted by its probability:
Rs,t(G) =
∑
G∈G
wG,G Rs,t(G)
=
∑
G∈G
 ∏
Ei∈E(G)
pi
∏
Ei∈E\E(G)
(1− pi) Rs,t(G)
 (3.2)
where we use E(G) to denote the set of edges in G. Using Equation 3.2, the
reachability of the uncertain graph in Figure 3.1 can be computed as follows
(after simplification):
Rs,t(G) = p1p2 + p4p5 + p1p3p5 − p1p2p3p5
− p1p2p4p5 − p1p3p4p5 + p1p2p3p4p5 (3.3)
Although this thesis only focuses on reachability, other graph-related proper-
ties can be translated to uncertain graphs in a similar fashion. For example,
for a deterministic graph G and two vertices s and t, if we denote Ds,t(G)
the length of shortest path (in term of hop count) from s to t in G, then
we can talk about the expected length of the shortest path from s to t in
an uncertain graph G, denoted as Ds,t(G), which can be defined similarly to
Equation 3.2 as follows:
Ds,t(G) =
∑
G∈G
wG,G Ds,t(G)
=
∑
G∈G
 ∏
Ei∈E(G)
pi
∏
Ei∈E\E(G)
(1− pi) Ds,t(G)
 (3.4)
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3.3 Estimating reachability of uncertain graphs
Most problems in uncertain graphs are #P-complete, including the problem
of computing reachability [15]. For that reason, sampling techniques have
been proposed to solving problems of large uncertain graphs [10], [12], [16],
[28] as the alternative to direct computation. A basic Monte Carlo method
for estimating the reachability of an uncertain graph G works as follows.
First, sample k possible worlds G1, . . . , Gk from G. This can be achieved by
sampling edges in G independently according to their existence probabilities.
Then, compute the reachability Rs,t(Gi) for each Gi, i = 1, . . . , k. The
reachability of the uncertain graph is estimated as:
R̂s,t(G) = 1
k
(
k∑
i=1
Rs,t(Gi)
)
(3.5)
The estimator R̂s,t(G) is a random variable whose mean isRs,t(G) (for this we
say the estimator is unbiased) and variance 1
k
Rs,t(G)(1−Rs,t(G)) [10], [28].
Advanced sampling techniques have been proposed to reduce the estimator
variance while requiring fewer samples [10], [12]. Those techniques rely on
the factor theorem [14] to recursively compute Rs,t(G) by conditioning on
the existence of an edge.
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CHAPTER 4
EXTENDED UNCERTAIN GRAPHS
While a promising tool, the existing uncertain graph formalism does not
support modeling of the correlation between edge existence. Such correlation
arises naturally from modeling various systems (Chapter 6 and 7). Here is
an example. Assume in a certain network, host 0 and host 1 can freely
communicate with all services running on host 1 and host 2, respectively.
Furthermore, both host 1 and host 2 run a similar set of services. If an
attacker from host 0 can gain access to host 1 by exploiting some vulnerability
of a service running on host 1, then surely he is also able to do so from host
1 to host 2. As we model the possibility of attacks in the network using an
uncertain graph, edge (0, 1) existence guarantees that edge (1, 2) also exists.
In other words, there is no possible world in which edge (0, 1) exists while
edge (1, 2) does not. This behavior cannot be modeled using the described
uncertain graphs where edges exist independently of one another (Section
4.4). As the result, an altered and more powerful formalism is required.
This chapter is organized as follows. First, we formally define the correla-
tion between edges and extend the basic uncertain graph formalism to model
such property (Section 4.1). Next, we show how to compute reachability of
extended uncertain graphs using a slightly modified version of Equation 3.2
(Section 4.2). Then, we define the concept of stochastic mapping (Section
4.3) and use it to prove that modeling the correlation between edges indeed
expands the expressiveness of basic uncertain graphs, in the sense that there
exists an extended uncertain graph that has no equivalent basic uncertain
graph (Section 4.4). Lastly, we prove an important result which says that ex-
tended uncertain graphs can model an arbitrary stochastic mapping, making
the two models equivalent in term of expressiveness (Section 4.5).
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4.1 Formal definition
Define a tuple G = (V,E,X, p, q) where
• V = {V1, . . . , Vn} and E = {E1, . . . , Em} are the set of vertices and
edges as before,
• X = {X1, . . . , Xr} is the set of independent Bernoulli random variables,
i.e. Xi ∈ {0, 1} for all Xi ∈ X,
• p = (p1, . . . , pr) ∈ [0, 1]r is the probability assignment vector of X, i.e.
pi = Pr(Xi = 1) = 1− Pr(Xi = 0) for i = 1, . . . , r, and lastly
• q is the assignment function that associates each edge Ei ∈ E with a
Boolean expression of the random variables in X using three Boolean
operators AND (∧), OR (∨), and NOT (¬). The existence of edge Ei
directly depends on the evaluation of its Boolean expression p(Ei), i.e.
edge Ei exists if and only if q(Ei) = 1.
We refer to this tuple as the extended uncertain graph, in contrast to the ba-
sic uncertain graph G = (V,E, p) defined in Section 3.1. By sharing random
variable(s) across different Boolean expressions in the assignment function
q, dependency between edges can be explicitly modeled. An example of an
extended uncertain graph is shown in Figure 4.1. When the context is clear,
we use the term uncertain graphs to refer to both basic and extended un-
certain graphs. Every basic uncertain graph G = (V,E, p) has an equivalent
extended uncertain graph representation G = (V,E,X, p, q), which uses m
random variables and q(Ei) = Xi for i = 1, . . . ,m; however, as we shall see
the reverse is not true.
4.2 Reachability of extended uncertain graphs
To compute the s, t-reachability of an extended uncertain graph, we sum up
the probabilities of all of its possible worlds in which s reaches t. Unlike
before, however, computing the probability of a given possible world is not
so easy since edges no longer exist independently of each other. An easier
approach is to iterate through every realization of Xi’s, and for each realiza-
tion construct the corresponding possible world by evaluating the Boolean
11
Algorithm 1 Computing the reachability of an extended uncertain graph.
Input: G = (V,E,X, p, q), s, t
Output: Rs,t
1: function Reachability(G, s, t)
2: Rs,t ← 0
3: for X ′ ∈ 2X do
4: w ← 1
5: for i ∈ [1, 2, . . . , r] do
6: if Xi ∈ X ′ then
7: Xi ← 1
8: w ← wpi
9: else
10: Xi ← 0
11: w ← w(1− pi)
12: E ′ ← {Ei ∈ E : q(Ei) = 1}
13: GX′ ← (V,E ′)
14: if s reaches t in GX′ then
15: Rs,t ← Rs,t + w
return Rs,t
expression of every edge. As a result, computing the probability of a possi-
ble world now reduces to computing the probability of a realization of Xi’s,
which is simply a product of probabilities since Xi’s are independent by defi-
nition. Specifically, let X ′ be a subset of X and GX′ the deterministic graph
realized from G by evaluating Xi to 1 if Xi ∈ X ′, otherwise Xi = 0. It is
easy to see that G generates GX′ with probability:
wGX′ ,G =
∏
Xi∈X′
Pr(Xi = 1)
∏
Xj∈X\X′
Pr(Xj = 0)
=
∏
Xi∈X′
pi
∏
Xj∈X\X′
(1− pj) (4.1)
The reachability of G can then be computed as
Rs,t(G) =
∑
X′∈2X
wGX′ ,G Rs,t(GX′)
=
∑
X′∈2X
 ∏
Xi∈X′
pi
∏
Xj∈X\X′
(1− pj)
 Rs,t(GX′) (4.2)
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where 2X denotes the superset of X. A straightforward implementation of
Equation 4.2 is given in Algorithm 1. For other methods to compute the
reachability using cutsets and pathsets, please refer to [9].
4.3 Stochastic mapping
Before proving the expressiveness of basic and extended uncertain graphs,
we first define the concept of stochastic mapping. If we consider uncertain
graphs as generative models of deterministic graphs, then each uncertain
graph defines a mapping from the set of possible worlds to the unit interval
[0, 1]. Let ΓV denote the set of all deterministic graphs with vertex set
V and N = |ΓV | = 2n(n−1) the size of ΓV (i.e. we consider all possible
directed edges except self-loops). Define a mapping f : ΓV → [0, 1] that
associates with each deterministic graph G ∈ ΓV a real number wG,G ∈
[0, 1]. If the mapping f satisfies the condition
∑
G∈ΓV f(G) = 1, then we call
it a stochastic mapping. A stochastic mapping is then a joint probability
distribution function over the space of deterministic graphs whose edges are
a subset of E. For a given uncertain graph G and stochastic mapping f
defined on the same edge set as G, if f(G) = wG,G for all G ∈ G, then we
call f the equivalent stochastic mapping of G; we denote that G ≡ f . Every
uncertain graph has an equivalent stochastic mapping and two uncertain
graphs are equivalent if they have the same stochastic mapping.
4.4 Expressiveness of basic uncertain graphs
In this section, we prove the following theorem:
Theorem 4.4.1. Extended uncertain graphs strictly expand the expressive-
ness of basic uncertain graphs, i.e. there exists an extended uncertain graph
that has no equivalent basic uncertain graph.
Proof. We prove this theorem by giving an example. Consider the extended
uncertain graph G in Figure 4.1. It has only two possible worlds G1 and
G2 with wG1,G = Pr(X1 = 0) = 0.5 and wG2,G = Pr(X1 = 1) = 0.5. We
will show that this extended uncertain graph has no equivalent basic uncer-
tain graph representation. Define the basic uncertain graph G ′ = (V,E, p)
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Pr(X1=1)=0.5
Figure 4.1: An extended uncertain graph and its only two possible worlds
with nonzero probabilities, wG1,G = wG2,G = 0.5. This graph does not have
an equivalent basic uncertain graph.
where V = (s, a, t), E = ((s, a), (a, s), (a, t), (t, a), (t, s), (s, t)) and p some
probability assignment vector. The definition of G ′ captures all possible ba-
sic uncertain graphs that can be constructed from three vertices s, a, t. The
probabilities of G1 and G2 in G ′ are:
wG1,G′ = (1− p1)(1− p2)(1− p3)(1− p4)(1− p5)(1− p6)
= (1− p1)(1− p3)Q
wG2,G′ = p1(1− p2)p3(1− p4)(1− p5)(1− p6)
= p1p3Q
where Q = (1 − p2)(1 − p4)(1 − p5)(1 − p6) and 0 < Q ≤ 1. Assume
by contradiction that G ′ produces the same stochastic mapping as G, or
equivalently wG1,G′ = wG2,G′ = 0.5, we have: 0 = wG1,G′ − wG2,G′ = (1 −
p1)(1 − p3)Q − p1p3Q = (1 − p1 − p3)Q. Since Q > 0, 1 − p1 − p3 = 0 or
p1 + p3 = 1. Moreover, 1 = wG1,G′ + wG2,G′ = (1 − p1)(1 − p3)Q + p1p3Q =
(1−p1−p3 + 2p1p3)Q = 2p1p3Q. Since Q ≤ 1, 2p1p3 = 1/Q ≥ 1. Combining
this with p1 + p3 = 1, we have (p1 + p3)
2− 2p1p3 ≤ 12− 1 = 0 or p21 + p23 ≤ 0,
and therefore p1 = p3 = 0. This solution does not satisfy p1 + p3 = 1, hence
no basic uncertain graph equivalent to G exists.
Although extended uncertain graphs strictly expand the expressiveness of
basic uncertain graphs, there are cases in which the extended uncertain graph
model of the studied system can be reduced to an equivalent basic uncertain
graph using simple graph transformation tricks (Section 7.3).
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4.5 Expressiveness of extended uncertain graphs
In this section, we show that our definition of extended uncertain graphs is
maximally expressive, in the sense that for any stochastic mapping of ΓV ,
we can construct an extended uncertain graph whose joint edge existence
probability distribution is identically that of ΓV ’s stochastic mapping.
Theorem 4.5.1. Every stochastic mapping has an equivalent extended un-
certain graph.
Proof. Fix the set of vertices V . Let f be a stochastic mapping defined over
ΓV = {G1, . . . , GN}. Define f (i) for i = 1, . . . , N the following mapping:
f (i)(Gj) =

f(Gj)∑i
k=1 f(Gk)
if 1 ≤ j ≤ i
0 if i < j ≤ N
Without loss of generality, assume f(G1) > 0 so that every f
(i) is well-
defined, and moreover, it is a valid stochastic mapping since
∑N
j=1 f
(i)(Gj) =
1. Especially, f (N) ≡ f . We will show how to iteratively construct an
equivalent extended uncertain graph G(i) of every f (i).
The first step is to show an equivalent extended uncertain graph G(1) of
f (1), a stochastic mapping that maps G1 to 1 and the rest in ΓV to 0. Define
the extended uncertain graph G(1) = (V,E,X(1), p(1), q(1)) as follows:
• V the set of vertices
• E the set of all n(n − 1) edges, i.e. G = (V,E) is a complete directed
graph
• X(1) = {X1}
• p(1) = (p1) where p1 = Pr(X1 = 1) = 1
• q(1) works as follows: ∀Ej ∈ E, if Ej ∈ E(G1) then q(1)(Ej) = X1, else
q(1)(Ej) = ¬X1
It can be easily seen that G(1) ≡ f (1).
Assume we have constructed G(i) = (V,E,X(i), p(i), q(i)) where X(i) =
{X1, . . . , Xi} and p(i) = (p1, . . . , pi) such that G(i) ≡ f (i) for some 1 ≤ i < N .
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G
Figure 4.2: Top: a stochastic mapping f and three deterministic graphs
with non-zero probabilities f(G1) = 0.5, f(G2) = 0.2, f(G3) = 0.3. Bottom:
an equivalent extended uncertain graph G of f generated using the
construction described in Section 4.5.
If f(Gi+1) = 0 then f
(i+1) ≡ f (i). Hence G(i+1) = G(i) is the equivalent ex-
tended uncertain graph of f (i+1). When f(Gi+1) > 0, the equivalent extended
uncertain graph:
G(i+1) = (V,E,X(i+1), p(i+1), q(i+1))
of f (i+1) can be constructed as follows:
• V the set of vertices
• E the set of all n(n− 1) edges
• X(i+1) = {X1, . . . , Xi, Xi+1} where Xi+1 is the newly introduced ran-
dom variable
• p(i+1) = (p1, . . . , pi, pi+1) where pi+1 =
∑i
j=1 f(Gj)∑i+1
j=1 f(Gj)
• q(i+1) works as follows: ∀Ej ∈ E, if Ej ∈ E(Gi+1) then q(i+1)(Ej) =
q(i)(Ej) ∨ ¬Xi+1, else q(i+1)(Ej) = q(i)(Ej) ∧Xi+1
The construction of G(i+1) works by scaling down the edge existence prob-
abilities in G(i) by a factor of pi+1 before adding the new graph Gi+1 with
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probability 1−pi+1 = 1−
∑i
j=1 f(Gj)∑i+1
j=1 f(Gj)
= f(Gi+1)∑i+1
j=1 f(Gj)
= f (i+1)(Gi+1). The last step
of the construction achieves this by first performing a logic AND operation
(∧) between the Boolean expression associated with every edge of G(i) and
the new random variable Xi+1, or formally q
(i+1)(Ej) = q
(i)(Ej)∧Xi+1. Then,
for every edge of G(i) that appears in Gi+1, we additionally perform a logic
OR operation (∨) between its associated Boolean expression and ¬Xi+1. The
whole purpose of doing so is to force G(i+1) to generate Gi+1 with probability
1−pi+1. Combining these two operations, the Boolean expression associated
with every edge of G(i+1) that appears in Gi+1 is:
q(i+1)(Ej) = (q
(i)(Ej) ∧Xi+1) ∨ ¬Xi+1
= (q(i)(Ej) ∨ ¬Xi+1) ∧ (Xi+1 ∨ ¬Xi+1)
= q(i)(Ej) ∨ ¬Xi+1
This process allows us to construct an equivalent extended uncertain graph
G(i) of f (i) for i = 1, . . . , N . As the result, G = G(N) will be the equivalent
extended uncertain graph of f since f ≡ f (N) ≡ G(N).
The construction outlined here introduces a new random variable for every
deterministic graph that has a non-zero probability in f . Therefore, the total
number of random variables used by the final extended uncertain graph is
r = |{Gi|f(Gi) > 0 for i = 1, . . . , N}|. For example, the extended uncertain
graph in Figure 4.2 only uses three random variables to model an equivalent
stochastic mapping in which only three deterministic graphs have non-zero
probabilities G1, G2, and G3. After the first, second, and last iteration of
the construction, the Boolean expressions associated with edge (s, a) in G(1),
G(2), and G(3) are X1, X1∨¬X2, and X1∨¬X2∨¬X3, respectively. We notice
that both edge (s, t) and (t, a) in G are associated with the same Boolean
expression (X1 ∧ X2) ∨ ¬X3. This is because (s, t) and (t, a) coexist in all
deterministic graphs that have a non-zero probability in f . In general, basic
uncertain graphs are not capable of modeling such a behavior.
The main importance of this result is that our particular method for ex-
tending uncertain graphs, motivated by a particular need to describe cor-
relation among edges in an attack graph, is capable of describing any joint
distribution of edge existence probabilities. This is an important founda-
tional result in the theory of uncertain graphs.
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CHAPTER 5
UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS
Uncertainty analysis plays an important role in understanding how uncer-
tainty in model inputs affects its output. While a selection of the probability
assignment vector p gives an expression of uncertainty, that expression itself
is likely inexact. This is partly because in many cases, p cannot be directly
computed or measured and hence some form of estimation is required. When
estimation is used, the resulting estimate usually comes with the form of a
mean, which is p, and an upper and lower bound. Analyses of uncertain
graphs therefore must be applied to p as well as its credible neighborhood so
that robust conclusions can be made [29]. Within the neighborhood of p, we
are interested in two probability assignment vectors under which the model
output, i.e. a property of the uncertain graph like reachability or expected
shortest path length, acquires its maximum and minimum value. Those ex-
trema tell us how much we should trust the value in the model output given
the uncertainty presented in the model input.
In this thesis, we focus on the reachability property of uncertain graphs
(first introduced in Section 3.2). Reachability has an intuitive interpreta-
tion in the context of security and forms the basis for answering numerous
security-related questions (Section 6.2). From now on, when we talk about
uncertainty analysis we will implicitly refer to uncertainty analysis with re-
spect to the reachability of uncertain graphs. In the remainder of this chap-
ter, we first formally define uncertainty analysis as the problem of finding the
extrema of the model output (Section 5.1). Then, we show how to quickly
identify the extrema using the monotonicity of reachability of the class of
monotone uncertain graphs (Section 5.2). Uncertain analysis of uncertain
graphs in general is NP-complete by reduction from a 3-SAT problem (Sec-
tion 5.3).
Remark 1. It is important to note that for the supplied edge existence
probability, we never truly know the underlying probability (if one exists)
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and do not consider such a value in our model. Instead, the edge existence
probability is the numerical representation of our belief (and the bounds
our confidence in the number), given the information we have collected and
subjected to the assumptions we have made.
5.1 Uncertainty model and monotonicity
Let G = (V,E,X, p, q) denote an extended uncertain graph and Rs,t(G) the
probability that there exists a path from s to t in G. Define  = (1, . . . , r) ∈
[0, 1]r the perturbation vector and Hp, the hyperrectangle obtained by per-
turbing each entry pi in p by an amount of at most i, or formally:
Hp, = {p′ ∈ [0, 1]r | |p′i − pi| ≤ i ∀i = 1, . . . , r} (5.1)
The mean, upper and lower bound of estimates described earlier can be
modeled using the probability assignment vector and perturbation vector.
Uncertainty analysis of uncertain graphs aims to find the extrema of the
reachability Rs,t(G) in the hyperrectangle Hp, as well as two probability
assignment vectors pmin, pmax in the hyperrectangle where the reachability
reaches its extrema, i.e:
pmin = argmin
p′∈Hp,
Rs,t(V,E,X, p′, q) (5.2)
pmax = argmax
p′∈Hp,
Rs,t(V,E,X, p′, q) (5.3)
Here we use the notation Rs,t(V,E,X, p′, q) to denote the reachability of the
extended uncertain graph G ′ = (V,E,X, p′, q).
Searching for pmin and pmax in Hp, is nontrivial, in part due to the #P-
completeness of computing reachability of uncertain graphs. Fortunately, the
monotonicity property of reachability allows us to quickly find pmin and pmax
without having to formulate and solve Equations 5.2 and 5.3 as optimization
problems. The monotonicity of reachability in the context of deterministic
graphs means (i) adding one or more edges to a deterministic graph does not
change its reachability status from 1 to 0 and vice versa, (ii) removing one
or more from the graph does not change its reachability status from 0 to 1.
The next section extends this property to the class of monotone uncertain
19
graphs – uncertain graphs whose edges are associated with monotone Boolean
expressions – and the implication regarding how to find pmin and pmax.
5.2 Uncertainty analysis of monotone uncertain graphs
A monotone uncertain graph is defined as an extended uncertain graph where
the assignment functions are restricted to monotone Boolean expressions [13],
i.e. those that only use the AND and OR logic operator and omit the NOT
operator. We first start with some observations about extended uncertain
graphs in general and monotone uncertain graphs in particular.
Corollary 5.2.0.1. By restricting the assignment functions to only functions
of the following form:
∀Ei ∈ E : q(Ei) ∈ X or ¬q(Ei) ∈ X (5.4)
we have a simpler yet completely equivalent definition of extended uncertain
graphs.1
Proof. Given an extended uncertain graph G = (V,E,X, p, q), the Boolean
expression q(Ei) for any Ei ∈ E can always be rewritten into an equivalent
expression in conjunctive normal form (i.e., AND of ORs):
p(Ei) =
k∧
i=1
(
ni∨
j=1
Yi,j
)
(5.5)
where either Yi,j ∈ X or ¬Yi,j ∈ X for all i, j. In a similar fashion, edge
Ei can be “expanded” into a subgraph in which each edge is associated with
either a Bernoulli random variable in X or its negation. The expansion graph
encodes the logical AND and OR operators of Equation 5.5 using series and
parallel graph construction as shown in Figure 5.1. By replacing each and
every edge in an extended uncertain graph with its expansion graph, we
arrive at Condition 5.4.
1We require that X always contains the special random variable X∗ where Pr(X∗ =
1) = 1. This degenerate random variable is used for all certain edges introduced in the
expansion graphs in Figure 5.1.
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Figure 5.1: Expanding the Boolean expression in Equation 5.5 into an
extended uncertain graph that satisfies Condition 5.4. For all i, j, either
Yi,j ∈ X or ¬Yi,j ∈ X.
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Figure 5.2: Two monotone uncertain graphs and their equivalent
representations satisfying Condition 5.6.
Using Condition 5.4, what is possible now is that two distinct edges may
be associated with the same Bernoulli random variable, or one edge to a
random variable and the other to its negation. As a special case, a monotone
uncertain graph can therefore be expanded into an uncertain graph in which
the assignment functions have the specific form
∀Ei ∈ E : q(Ei) ∈ X (5.6)
For example, Figure 5.2 shows two 2-vertex monotone uncertain graphs and
how they can be transformed into equivalent uncertain graphs that satisfy
Condition 5.6. This observation allows us to prove the monotonicity of reach-
ability of monotone uncertain graphs, which is stated below.
Theorem 5.2.1. Let G = (V,E,X, p, q) and G ′ = (V,E,X, p′, q) be two
monotone uncertain graphs. Furthermore, let pi ≥ p′i for i = 1, . . . , r. For
all s, t ∈ V , the following inequality holds: Rs,t(G) ≥ Rs,t(G ′).
Proof. Since G and G ′ are monotone uncertain graphs, without loss of gen-
erality, we can assume their assignment functions follow Condition 5.6. We
first prove a special case of Theorem 5.2.1 in which G ′ = (V,E,X, p′, q) where
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p′ = (p′1, p2, . . . , pr). Define E
1 ⊆ E the set of all edges associated with the
random variable X1 and assume E
1 6= ∅ (otherwise, redefine G and G ′ without
X1). Furthermore, define two following uncertain graphs:
G0 = (V,E\E1, X, (p2, p3 . . . , pr), q)
G1 = (V,E,X, (1, p2, . . . , pr), q)
Put simply, all possible worlds in G1 contain all edges in E1 while none in G0
contains any. The reachability of G and G ′ with respect to any s, t ∈ V can
be computed by conditioning on the random variable X1 as follows:
Rs,t(G) = p1Rs,t(G1) + (1− p1)Rs,t(G0)
Rs,t(G ′) = p′1Rs,t(G1) + (1− p′1)Rs,t(G0)
Hence:
Rs,t(G)−Rs,t(G ′) = (p1 − p′1)
(Rs,t(G1)−Rs,t(G0))
Since p1 ≥ p′1, we only need to prove that Rs,t(G1) ≥ Rs,t(G0). For every
possible world G1 ∈ G1, the four following properties hold:
1. G1 contains all edges in E1,
2. G0, as the result of removing all edges in E1 from G1, is a possible
world in G0,
3. wG1,G1 = wG0,G0 , and lastly
4. Rs,t(G
1) ≥ Rs,t(G0) according to the monotonicity of reachability of
deterministic graph.
Consequently:
wG1,G1Rs,t(G
1) ≥ wG0,G0Rs,t(G0)∑
G1∈G1
wG1,G1Rs,t(G
1) ≥
∑
G0∈G0
wG0,G0Rs,t(G
0)
Rs,t(G1) ≥ Rs,t(G0)
Therefore, Rs,t(G) ≥ Rs,t(G ′) for a specific case in which G ′ = (V,E,X, p′, q)
where p′ = (p′1, p2, . . . , pr).
22
Define G(i) = (V,E,X, p(i), q) where p(i) = (p′1, . . . , p′i, pi+1, . . . , pr) for
i = 1, . . . , r. Note that G(0) = G and G(r) = G ′. By chaining the inequali-
ties in the following fashion where each holds as a specific case, Rs,t(G) =
Rs,t(G(0)) ≥ Rs,t(G(1)) ≥ . . . ≥ Rs,t(G(r−1)) ≥ Rs,t(G(r)) = Rs,t(G ′), the
theorem is proven.
The next result immediately follows Theorem 5.2.1:
Corollary 5.2.1.1. Let G = (V,E,X, p, q) be a monotone uncertain graph,
 ∈ [0, 1]r a perturbation vector such that pi − i ≥ 0 and pi + i ≤ 1 for
i = 1, . . . , r. We have: pmin = p−  and pmax = p+ .
As the main result of this section, Corollary 5.2.1.1 shows us how to per-
form uncertainty analysis of monotone uncertain graphs. The set of all mono-
tone uncertain graphs contains all basic uncertain graphs but strictly sub-
sumes the set of all extended uncertain graphs, as one might expect. If we
take the extended uncertain graph in Figure 4.1 and change the Boolean ex-
pression associated with edge (a, t) from X1 to ¬X1, then we obtain a graph
that does not have an equivalent monotone uncertain graph representation.
5.3 Uncertainty analysis of extended uncertain graphs
In the last section of this chapter, we show that uncertainty analysis of
extended uncertain graphs in general is a hard problem by showing that
any 3-SAT problem can be reduced to the problem of finding the maxi-
mum reachability of an extended uncertain graph where the probability as-
signment vector is defined within a certain hyperrectangle. Specifically, let
x = (x1, x2, . . . , xr) be the set of r Boolean variables and:
F =
n∧
i=1
(ci,1 ∨ ci,2 ∨ ci,3) (5.7)
is an n-clauses Boolean formula where ci,j are the literals, i.e. either ci,j ∈
x or ¬ci,j ∈ x. Consider the following extended uncertain graph G =
(V,E,X, p, q) constructed after F :
• V = {V1, V2, . . . , Vn+1}, s ≡ V1 and t ≡ Vn+1,
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• E = {E1, E2, . . . , En} where Ei = (Vi, Vi+1),
• X = {X1, X2, . . . , Xr},
• pi = Pr(Xi = 1) = 0.5 for i = 1, 2, . . . , r, and
• q(Ei) = Ci,1 ∨ Ci,2 ∨ Ci,3 which mimics the i-th clause of the Boolean
formula F in the sense that if ci,j = xk then Ci,j = Xk, otherwise if
ci,j = ¬xk then Ci,j = ¬Xk.
Finally, let us define the search space Hp, where  = 0.5 – in other words,
the search space is exactly the unit hypercube Hp, ≡ [0, 1]r. We then have
the following result.
Corollary 5.3.0.1. F is satisfiable if and only if max
p′∈[0,1]r
Rs,t(V,E,X, p′, q) =
1.
Proof. The “only if” part of the Corollary is straightforward given the con-
struction. For the “if” part, note that if max
p′∈[0,1]r
Rs,t(V,E,X, p′, q) = 1 then
p∗ = argmax
p′∈[0,1]r
Rs,t(V,E,X, p′, q) is a binary vector, i.e. either p∗i = 0 or p∗i = 1
for all i. This comes from the fact that Rs,t(V,E,X, p′, q) is a linear function
of p′i for all i. Given the binary probability assignment vector p
∗, we can
easily find the corresponding truth assignment to xi’s that satisfies F .
We have just shown that a 3-SAT problem can be reduced to the uncer-
tainty analysis problem of extended uncertain graphs. As a result, uncer-
tainty analysis of extended uncertain graphs is NP-complete. Not surpris-
ingly, this is usually the price we have to pay for extending the expressiveness
of a modeling formalism. However, since the NOT logic operator is not re-
quired in the modeling examples in Chapters 6 and 7, uncertainty analysis
can be performed efficiently in both cases.
Remark 2. Incorporating uncertainty into the model input is one step
toward producing more trustworthy analyses. However, a large amount of
uncertainty in the model input will likely produce a large amount of uncer-
tainty in the model output. Although uncertainty analysis helps us quantify
this relation, it does not tell exactly what part of the input’s uncertainty
contributes the most to the output’s. This information is crucial to a mod-
eler who desires to draw a more robust conclusion about the system and who
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wants to know the best places to spend on reducing uncertainty (by collect-
ing more information, adding more details into the model, etc.) When this
is the case, a different but closely related form of analysis called sensitivity
analysis should be considered.
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CHAPTER 6
CASE STUDY: STUXNET PARTIAL
ATTACK GRAPH
In the first modeling example, we show how to use an uncertain graph to
model a partial attack graph of the Stuxnet worm (Figure 6.1), the infamous
cyberweapon that sabotaged the Iranian nuclear program in 2009.
6.1 Modeling approach
On a high level, Stuxnet can be abstracted using logical steps that allow the
worm to get access to the control system network of an air-gapped nuclear
facility (Figure 6.1). Converting the Stuxnet partial attack graph (denoted as
GStux) to an uncertain graph (denoted as GStux) is relatively straightforward.
GStux uses the same set of vertices as in GStux. Each random variable of GStux
represents a unique edge label of GStux, so we will have a random variable for
“Targeted Email With Dropper”, another for “Infected USB Drive”, and so
on. Multiple edges of GStux that share the same starting and ending vertex
are merged into a single edge of GStux. Each edge of GStux is associated with a
disjunction of random variables where each variable represents an edge label
of GStux. For example if Ei = (con, lap) (Table 6.1) then q(Ei) = XS7∨XUSB
(Table 6.2 and Table 6.3). The complete description of GStux is given below:
• V = { web, splc, his, eng, tra, ecn, oss, wrm, vic, wrk, edr, cas, plc,
emp, win, lap, con} (please refer to Table 6.1 for descriptions).
• E = {(web, eng), (web, oss), (web, win), (splc, vic), (his, oss), (his,
cas), (eng, plc), (eng, splc), (tra, emp), (ecn, his), (ecn, cas), (oss, plc),
(wrm, con), (wrm, emp), (wrm, tra), (wrk, cas), (wrk, eng), (wrk, ecn),
(edr, ecn), (cas, web), (plc, vic), (emp, wrk), (emp, wrk), (win, oss),
(win, eng), (lap, ecn), (con, emp), (con, lap), (con, cas), (con, eng),
(con, edr)}.
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Figure 6.1: Stuxnet partial attack graph (figure reprinted from [30])
• X = {XUSB, XIOMOD, XCRA, XERA, XS7, XSHR, XEMAIL, XWINCC ,
XLMOD, XPRINT , XSERV , XSAB, XLNK} (please refer to Table 6.2 for
descriptions).
• p = (p0, p1, . . . , p12) where p0 = Pr(XUSB = 1), p1 = Pr(XIOMOD =
1), and so on.
• q is given in Table 6.3.
The remaining task is to come up with numerical values for the probability
assignment vector of GStux. Those numbers, which may include both the
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means and their bounds, can be obtained after performing a full security
auditing of the system.
Table 6.1: Vertices of GStux.
Index Vertex Description
0 web Web Nav Server
1 splc S7-417 Safety PLCs
2 his Historian Managers Workstation
3 eng Engineering Station
4 tra Tradeshow
5 ecn ECN Servers
6 oss OS Server
7 wrm Worm Creator
8 vic Target Industrial Process
9 wrk Employee Workstation
10 edr External Drive
11 cas CAS Server
12 plc S7-315 PLCs
13 emp Employee
14 win WinCC Server
15 lap Laptop
16 con Contractor
Table 6.2: Random variables used in GStux.
Index Random variable Description
0 XUSB Infected USB Drive
1 XIOMOD IO Modification
2 XCRA Contractor Remote Access
3 XERA Employee Remote Access
4 XS7 S7 Project Files
5 XSHR Network Share
6 XEMAIL Targeted Email With Dropper
7 XWINCC WinCC DB Exploit
8 XLMOD Logic Modification
9 XPRINT Print Server Vulnerability
10 XSERV Server Service Vulnerability
11 XSAB Sabotage
12 XLNK Lnk Vulnerability
Define s as the wrm vertex and t the vic vertex, using Algorithm 1 for sym-
bolic computation, the reachability of the monotone uncertain graph GStux
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Table 6.3: Assignment functions used in GStux.
Index Edge Assignment function
0 (web, eng) XS7 XSHR
1 (web, oss) XSHR
2 (web, win) XSHR ∨XWINCC ∨XSERV
3 (splc, vic) XIOMOD
4 (his, oss) XUSB
5 (his, cas) XWINCC
6 (eng, plc) XLMOD
7 (eng, splc) XLMOD
8 (tra, emp) XUSB
9 (ecn, his) XSHR
10 (ecn, cas) XSHR
11 (oss, plc) XLMOD
12 (wrm, con) XUSB ∨XEMAIL ∨XSAB
13 (wrm, emp) XEMAIL
14 (wrm, tra) XSAB
15 (wrk, cas) XERA
16 (wrk, eng) XERA
17 (wrk, ecn) XSHR ∨XPRINT ∨XSERV
18 (edr, ecn) XS7 ∨XLNK
19 (cas, web) XS7vXSHR ∨XWINCC ∨XPRINT ∨XSERV
20 (plc, vic) XIOMOD
21 (emp, wrk) XUSB
22 (emp, wrk) XS7
23 (win, oss) XSHR
24 (win, eng) XSHR
25 (lap, ecn) XSHR ∨XPRINT
26 (con, emp) XUSB ∨XS7
27 (con, lap) XUSB ∨XS7
28 (con, cas) XCRA
29 (con, eng) XCRA
30 (con, edr) XS7
can be computed as (after simplification)Rs,t(GStux) = p1p8(p0p11p2p3p4p5p6−
p0p11p2p3p4p5 − p0p11p2p3p4p6 + p0p11p2p3p4 − p0p11p2p4p5p6 + p0p11p2p4p5 +
p0p11p2p6− p0p11p2− p0p11p3p4p5p6 + p0p11p3p4p5 + p0p11p3p4p6− p0p11p3p4 +
p0p11p4p5p6 − p0p11p4p5 − p0p2p3p4p5p6 + p0p2p3p4p6 + p0p2p3p5 − p0p2p3 +
p0p2p4p5p6− p0p2p5− p0p2p6 + p0p2 + p0p3p4p5p6− p0p3p4p6− p0p3p5 + p0p3−
p0p4p5p6 + p0p5 − p11p2p3p4p5p6 + p11p2p3p4p5 + p11p2p3p4p6 − p11p2p3p4 +
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p11p2p4p5p6−p11p2p4p5−p11p2p6+p11p2+p11p3p4p5p6−p11p3p4p5−p11p3p4p6+
p11p3p4 − p11p4p5p6 + p11p4p5 + p2p3p4p5p6 − p2p3p4p6 − p2p4p5p6 + p2p6 −
p3p4p5p6 + p3p4p6 + p4p5p6). Even without knowing the values of the proba-
bility assignment vector, there are two immediate observations we can make
here.
First, in the formula ofRs,t(GStux) there are four missing parameters. They
are p7, p9, p10, and p12, which correspond to the random variables XWINCC ,
XPRINT , XSERV , and XLNK , respectively (Table 6.2). The reason why those
four parameters are eliminated from the formula can be attributed to the
specific structure and the assignment functions of the Stuxnet graph. To
understand this, consider a much simpler example in Figure 6.2. In this
uncertain graph G, s reaches t via a when X1 = X2 = 1, but if X1 = 1 then
s can also get to t via b. Hence X1 is the only deciding factor that dictates
whether s can reach t or not; in other words, Rs,t(G) = Pr(X1 = 1).
Second, the reachability formula of GStux can be factored into a product
of three terms. The first two are p1 and p8, which correspond to the random
variables XIOMOD and XLMOD, respectively. This factorization can be un-
derstood by visually inspecting the Stuxnet graph. By setting either XLMOD
or XIOMOD to 0, the attack graph is partitioned at the control system net-
work layer. Therefore, all paths from the wrm vertex to the vic vertex are
disabled. Hence, these two are among the deciding factors regarding whether
wrm can reach vic or not. The third term of the product is a rather lengthy
formula that cannot be factored any further – this means there is no other
single factor that can singlehandedly disable all paths from wrm to vic like
XLMOD or XIOMOD.
6.2 Security analysis
The resulting uncertain graph GStux, its reachability formula Rs,t(GStux), and
the uncertainty analysis in the previous chapter allow an analyst to answer
the following security-related questions:
1. What is the probability that there exists a path from outside of the
system to a targeted industrial process?
2. To what extent should I trust the computed reachability probability –
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Figure 6.2: An extended uncertain graph with a redundant edge (a, t).
in other words, how sensitive is it to perturbation of model input?
3. If some form of network hardening is applied to the system and the
probability assignment vector re-estimated, will reachability probabil-
ity be reduced, and if so, by how much?
4. Instead of performing network hardening, I want to deploy an intrusion
detection system (IDS) to detect ongoing attacks. Assume I choose to
monitor a specific set of hosts, what is the probability that I miss an
attack?
5. What should I do if the outcome of the analysis is not precise enough
to draw any conclusion?
Questions 1 and 3 ask about the reachability of the uncertain graph which
is estimated by means of sampling as shown in Section 3.3. Since the size
of Rs,t(GStux) is relatively small, reachability can be directly computed using
Equation 3.2 and Algorithm 1. Uncertainty analysis in Chapter 5 answers
Question 2 since GStux is a monotone uncertain graph. Question 4 can be
rephrased into the problem of estimating reachability of uncertain graphs;
i.e., if I remove the set of vertices that correspond to the set of monitored
hosts (together with all edges that connect to and from those vertices), what
is the probability that t remains reachable from s? Question 5 is likely to
arise in practice and usually indicates that the given amount of information
is not sufficient to reason about the security posture of the system (refer to
Remark 2 at the end of Chapter 5).
To complete the chapter, we include some numerical result in Figure 6.3.
When pi is set to 0.2 for all i, the reachability of the Stuxnet uncertain graph
is Rs,t(GStux) = 0.00687 as shown in the solid horizontal line. To study the
effect of pi’s on the overall reachability, we pick one parameter at a time,
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Figure 6.3: Reachability of the Stuxnet uncertain graph under different
probability assignment vectors.
set it to 0 (dashed line marked with black circle) or to 1 (solid line marked
with x) and recompute the reachability. It is obvious that p1 (XIOMOD) and
p8 (XLMOD) contribute the most to the change in reachability, which was
observed from the formula earlier on. The figure also shows us some other
information that was not obvious from before, e.g. after p1 and p8, p0 (XUSB)
and p2 (XCRA) are the next important parameters to consider.
32
CHAPTER 7
CASE STUDY: NETWORK SECURITY
WITH SERVICE UNCERTAINTY
In the second modeling example, we show how to use uncertain graphs to
model a computer network with incomplete information about the network
services, or service uncertainty. We first introduce the studied network and
some basic networking concepts (Section 7.1). Then we define the threat
model (Section 7.2) and propose an approach to model service uncertainty
using uncertain graph (Section 7.3). We conclude the section with a note
on how the probability assignment vector can be estimated using available
information obtained from the common vulnerability databases.
7.1 Network model
Figure 7.1 shows a simple enterprise network consisting of 3 firewalls and 8
hosts. The firewall rules regulate the communication traffic in the network
and define which hosts can directly talk to the other. For example, the 5-
tuple rule <6,0,1,*,80> of firewall 1 allows all TCP traffic (protocol type
6) from any port on host 0 to port 80 on host 1. The deny-by-default policy
is applied to all firewalls. As a result, firewall 1 blocks all TCP traffic from
any port on host 0 to port 25 on host 1. The given enterprise network and
the firewall rulesets effectively define a flow graph of logically connected hosts
(Figure 7.2). The flow graph is a directed graph where each vertex represents
a host in the enterprise network and each directed edge a flow, i.e. a logical
connection. For example, the directed edge from vertex 0 to vertex 1 with the
label <80> in Figure 7.2 represents a 3-tuple flow <6:0-65535:80-80> (i.e.
the protocol, the source and destination port). There can be more than one
flow from one host to another and in that case, the flow graph is a directed
multigraph.
The flow graph is a general description of the types of traffic allowed be-
33
Host 
0
Host 
3
Host 
1
Host 
2
Host 
4
Host 
5
Host 
6
Host 
7
Firewall 1
Firewall 2
Firewall 3
<6,0,1,*,80>
<6,0,2,*,21>
<6,4,5,*,22>
<6,7,6,*,21>
<6,7,6,*,21>
<6,3,7,*,25>
Figure 7.1: An enterprise network with 3 firewalls and 8 hosts (example
adopted from [31], slightly modified for illustration purposes).
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Figure 7.2: Flow graph representation of the enterprise network in Figure
7.1. Label <80> on flow from vertex 0 to vertex 1 is short for
<6:0-65535:80-80>. Flows without label allow any traffic.
tween hosts in the network. Knowing that flow <6:0-65535:80-80> from
host 0 to host 1 exists, we can make an educated guess that host 1 runs some
form of an http service. For the purpose of security modeling and analysis,
we are also interested in knowing the version and configuration details of the
service. Without such information, the existence of a flow does not necessar-
ily imply that an attacker can utilize it as a part of his lateral movement. In
fact, the flow might exist while its corresponding service is not running at all.
Security modeling and analysis under unquantified input uncertainty will not
produce any significant result since any outcome is equally likely. However, if
we are allowed to make further assumptions, which are reasonable ones, then
the service uncertainty in flow graphs can be greatly reduced and reasonably
estimated using augmented information from the public domain.
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7.2 Threat model
We assume the attacker has already gained access to host 0. His ultimate
goal is to gain access to host 6, which we know as a critical asset in the
system. To simplify the discussion, we make some further assumptions:
• The attacker only exploits vulnerability of network services running on
the receiving host of flows. As a result, if no flow from host 0 to host
1 is allowed or host 1 does not run any vulnerable service, then the
attacker cannot launch a direct attack from host 0 to host 1.
• The flow graph remains unchanged throughout the attack period, mean-
ing the attacker does not attempt to attack the firewalls and modify
the rulesets to enable new flows.
• Local attacks are not modeled; we assume the attacker is capable of
performing privilege escalation to acquire the highest access level after
getting access to a machine.
7.3 Modeling approach
Define X1,80 and X1,!80 as the random variables that denote whether host
1 runs a vulnerable service on port 80 and on some other port. The flow
graph in Figure 7.2 indicates the correlation between exploitability of flows
in the following sense. If host 1 runs a vulnerable http service on port 80,
or X1,80 = 1, then an attacker on either host 0 or 2 can use the existing
flows to attack host 1. In contrast, if host 1 does not run any vulnerable
http service on port 80, or X1,80 = 0, the attacker cannot attack host 1
from host 0. However, he might be able to do so from host 2, given that
host 1 runs a vulnerable service on some other port, i.e. X1,!80 = 1. If we
convert the flow graph to an extended uncertain graph with the same set of
vertices and edges, then such a property can be modeled by associating edge
(0, 1) with X1,80 and edge (2, 1) with X1,80 ∨ X1,!80. Repeating this process
to other edges and vertices, we can build an extended uncertain graph that
models the service uncertainty and the correlation between edge existence
of the flow graph in Figure 7.2. In this modeling example, by using simple
graph transformation tricks we can further reduce such an extended uncertain
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Figure 7.3: Basic uncertain graph representation of the flow graph in Figure
7.2.
graph to an equivalent basic uncertain graph GServ as shown in Figure 7.3
and tabulated in Table 7.1. The transformation introduces artifacts like
certain edges, i.e. edges that exist with probability one (solid arrows), and
extra vertices (bold circles). Defining s as vertex 0 and t vertex 6, and using
Algorithm 1 for symbolic computation, the reachability of the basic uncertain
graph GServ can be computed as (after simplification):
Rs,t(GServ) = (p2 + p4 − p2p4)(p0p6p10 + p1p7p8
+ p7p8p10 − p1p7p8p10 − p0p6p7p8p10) (7.1)
As before, we notice that the reachability formula can be nicely factored into
a product form. To double check the result, we can examine the first term
of the formula (p2 + p4− p2p4), which is equal to 0 if both p2 = 0 and p4 = 4.
This translates to removing both uncertain edges (1a, 1) and (2a, 2) from
GServ, which in turn disables every path from vertex 0 to vertex 6 as seen
from Figure 7.3, causing Rs,t(GServ) = 0. We also notice a few parameters
missing from the formula. They are p3, p5, and p9, which correspond to
random variables X1,!80, X2,!21, and X5,!22, respectively.
In the last part the section, we briefly discuss how to estimate the prob-
ability assignment vector for the constructed uncertain graph. The security
analyst may assume (or he may learn from the system administrator) that
without exception, all network services run on standard network ports, i.e.
http services on port 80, ftp services on port 21, smtp services on port 25, and
so on. The problem of service uncertainty still persists but the uncertainty
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Table 7.1: Uncertain edges and associated random variables in GServ.
Index Edge Random variable Probability
0 (3, 7) X7,25 p0
1 (5, 6) X6,!21 p1
2 (1a, 1) X1,80 p2
3 (1b, 1) X1,!80 p3
4 (2a, 2) X2,21 p4
5 (2b, 2) X2,!21 p5
6 (3a, 3) X3 p6
7 (4a, 4) X7 p7
8 (5a, 5) X5,22 p8
9 (5b, 5) X5,!22 p9
10 (6a, 6) X6,21 p10
is now greatly reduced, since the analyst can infer that in order to make a
direct lateral movement from host 0 to host 1, host 1 must run a vulnerable
http service. The probability that host 1 runs a vulnerable http service, i.e.
Pr(X1,80 = 1), can be estimated as follows. For each http implementation
h, the analyst searches in the common vulnerability databases (e.g. the Na-
tional Vulnerability Database1) to see if there exists any vulnerability of h
that can be exploited to compromise the hosting machine. Denote v(h) = 1
if the analyst finds at least one vulnerability and v(h) = 0 otherwise. The
probability assigned to X1,80 can be estimated as:
Pr(X1,80 = 1) =
∑
hwhv(h)∑
hwh
(7.2)
where wh is the relative weight assigned to implementation h. If no further
information is given, all implementations carry the same weight. This ap-
proach allows her to compute the most part of the probability assignment
vector used in Equation 7.1 except for p1 = Pr(X6,!21 = 1). To estimate p1,
the analyst needs to find out all other services running on host 6 and use
Equation 7.2 to compute the aggregated probability. If no further informa-
tion is given, the analyst may assume host 6 has some default probability
pdef of running a vulnerable network service. The probability assignment
1https://nvd.nist.gov/
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p10 = Pr(X6,21 = 1), p1 = Pr(X6,!21 = 1) and p
def are related according to:
pdef = p1 + p10 − p1p10 (7.3)
Therefore, p1 can be computed as:
p1 =
pdef − p10
1− p10 (7.4)
Numerical results of the analyses are not reported in this thesis and will
be a significant topic in follow-up work, in which we study larger and more
realistic systems.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
In this thesis, we show how to use uncertain graphs for the security modeling
and analysis of computer systems with uncertainty. In doing so, we have
extended the traditional uncertain graph formalism to model the correlation
between edge existence and prove theoretical results about the expressiveness
of basic and extended uncertain graphs. We also show how to perform uncer-
tainty analysis of monotone uncertain graphs. Modeling-wise, the developed
examples serve as a starting point for taking on larger and more complex
systems. In such systems, uncertainty arises from modeling at different lay-
ers of abstraction and from the presence of humans-in-the-loop. Regarding
humans, uncertain graphs can use existing human-related models to plug
holes in the overall attack graph and model the probability that a phishing
campaign succeeds or the probability that a power grid operator plugs in
the USB stick he received at the conference. Analysis-wise, we are also in-
terested in formulating and solving optimization problems to find the best
defense actions, which minimizes the probability of a successful attack, given
a limited budget. These aspects will be explored in subsequent studies.
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